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WHAT DISCOURSE GOALS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
THE USE OF HYPERBOLE?
attila l. nemesi
Abstract
Although hyperbole is a ubiquitous means of discourse, its role in interpersonal rhetoric
has been examined to a much lesser extent than that of metaphor or irony. This paper
investigates what discourse goals can be fulfilled by hyperbole, using conversations
from some classic Hungarian films as the data. The reason why film conversations
were selected is that the knowledge of the story and the transparency of the char-
acters’ intentions make the understanding of communicative motives easy. Besides,
the situations in feature films are very similar to spontaneous everyday interactions.
Analyses demonstrate that hyperbolic utterances convey the speakers’ attitudes, ei-
ther real or only presented, towards the topic of conversation. According to the social
psychological laws of public behaviour, the expression of emotional relation or attitude
is mostly subordinated to the speaker’s attempt to construct an intended impression
on conversational partners. Thus, the use of hyperbole has two main goals: to express
emotions and to reach a desired self-presentation.
1. Introduction
From ancient rhetoric to present-day study of language use and compre-
hension, hyperbole (also called overstatement or exaggeration) has been
seen as one of the most prominent figures of speech. Since it is a frequent
phenomenon not only in oratorical or artistic texts but in familiar conver-
sation as well, and its usage (that is, the augmentation of the intensity of
real state of affairs to extremity) differs from the communication of literal
meanings, it also falls within the competence of pragmatics. Grice’s clas-
sic (1975) article posited that figures such as hyperbole, irony, metaphor,
and meiosis (or litotes) are cases of flouting the Maxim of Quality: the
hearer can restore the meaning of the literally false proposition by cal-
culating an appropriate implicature. It is not obvious, however, what
kind(s) of social goals underlie the generation of such implicatures for it
can be supposed that the shift from maximally effective, direct broadcast
of meaning is explained by some kind(s) of interactional intentions.
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In the present paper, I aim to account for the role of hyperbole in
discourse combining the insights of the Gricean theory of conversational
implicature and the theory of impression management developed in social
psychology. I assume that the conversational partner, facing an exagger-
ation, does not only recognize the violation of the Maxim of Quality but
he/she also conveys certain facets of the speaker’s face (see Goffman 1955;
Brown–Levinson 1978; 1987; Tracy 1990; Mao 1994) and his/her relation
to the topic of conversation. In other words, the speaker chooses hyper-
bolic statements to form a desired impression of his/her face and his/her
attitude towards the topic of speech in the hearer.
Both traditional rhetoric, stylistics, and the much younger empiri-
cal psycholinguistics and pragmatics, have greatly contributed to reveal
the background of the usage of hyperbole. As basic preliminaries, these
contributions will be detailed in section 2. Then, in section 3, I will de-
monstrate that the role of hyperbole in discourse can be successfully
investigated only by means of an analysis that takes into consideration
the context in which the hyperbolic utterance occurs. In section 4, I will
introduce the notion of self-implicature as the cornerstone of a complex
model I will elaborate on within the field of social psychological prag-
matics (see Muntigl–Turnbull 1998, 226). This model will be tested by
further examples in section 5.
2. A review of literature
2.1. Figurative language and interpersonal rhetoric
The strict separation of linguistic tools employed for literary expression
or public persuasion and those used in casual conversation cannot be
held any more, as some of the figures of speech that have been tradi-
tionally classified within the scope of rhetoric appear frequently in the
situations of everyday communication. Their pervasiveness in such con-
texts also indicates that the need for efficiency can be recognized not
only in consciously rhetorized texts but in interpersonal rhetoric as well
(Leech 1983, 15). The recognition of this fact is by no means new in
linguistics. In the early 20th century, Charles Bally (1913, 32) portrayed
language as an arm: the speaker utilizes it in order to force his/her own
thoughts upon the conversational partner. Thus, the language of com-
munication is driven by an instinctive rhetoric, which makes its own use
of strategies of eloquence; or rather, it is eloquence that once borrowed
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them from conversation. There is no absolute consensus about the exact
number of (and clear-cut distinction concerning) these strategies within
the literature. But it is agreed that at least metaphors (My office was
a bedlam today), irony (Thanks for your help! — when a meddlesome
neighbour breaks the speaker’s precious Chinese vase while packing), hy-
perbole (I have a million duties before noon), litotes (Punctuality is not
your best virtue—when the partner arrives too late to the meeting again),
simile (This plum is as sweet as honey) and rhetorical question (Who do
you think you are? ) have as important a role in ordinary conversation
as in public and literary registers (see, e.g., Szathmári 1958; Lausberg
1960/1998; Grice 1975; Leech 1983; Brown–Levinson 1978; 1987; Fogelin
1988; Sperber–Wilson 1990; Kreuz–Roberts 1993; Gibbs 1994; Fónagy
2001).
Kreuz et al. (1996) assessed the relative frequency of these forms of
nonliteral language in a randomly selected, 96-page corpus of contempo-
rary American short stories, containing about 38,000 words. They found
that hyperbole (accounting for 27% of the forms of figurative language
in the corpus) was a close second after the first ranked metaphor (29%),
highly surpassing the rate of its logical opposite, litotes (3%), for exam-
ple. Although it can be suspected that these statistics are not universal
but dependent on language and genre, the authors rightly mention that
the phenomenon of such a frequent occurrence of hyperbole should have
attracted more attention than it is suggested by the low number of rele-
vant publications and relatively few theoretical developments.
2.2. Describing the phenomenon of hyperbole
At the level of literal meaning the hyperbolic linguistic expression ei-
ther makes the sentence unequivocally false (e.g., There were countless
applicants for the job — since the applicants could have been counted)
or difficult to decide its truth value because of the additional emotive
content (e.g., Your performance was frenetic —for there is no objective
scale in this respect, other judges can have different opinion of that).
The quantitative augmentation of real states of affairs (unfortunately,
hyperbole is not defined more exactly in the literature) makes big things
bigger, and small things smaller. Thus, diminution is also a kind of
hyperbole (e.g., There’s absolutely nothing on the telly this evening), al-
though some scholars discuss it separately from augmentation (cf. Szath-
mári 1958, 148). The saliency and evocative effect of hyperbole make
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our attention focus on the manner of the linguistic performance and are
the source of its expressivity (see Bally 1913, 26–8; Péter 1984, 231–3;
Péter 1991, 40–4). As a word figure, universal quantifiers (always, every,
nobody, etc.), superlatives of adjectives or adverbs, repetition (a long long
way, very-very difficult, etc.), (usually round) numerals and evaluative-
qualifying lexemes (abominable, brilliant, milksop, stony-hearted, etc.) of-
fer a possibility of ‘lying’, claiming literally implausible extremities (Laus-
berg 1960/1998, 263–4, 410–1; Fónagy 1975, 481–2; Péter 1991, 65–70).
As a thought figure, the structure of words, the whole sentence, or more
than one sentence can express such vertical gradations (e.g., The man who
will make me gobble up mushrooms is not yet born —quoted by Fónagy
2001, 219 from the film Buffet froid by Bertrand Blier, 1979). Another pe-
culiar aspect of hyperbole is that it tends to co-occur with other forms of
figurative language (cf. Szathmári 1958, 146; Lausberg 1960/1998, 263–4,
410–1; Kreuz–Roberts 1995; Kreuz et al. 1996, 92; Kreuz et al. 1998, 93;
Colston–Keller 1998), usually with simile, as in (1a), metaphors, as in
(1b), irony, as in (1c), and idioms, as in (1d):
(a)(1) You have as many nice clothes as stars in the sky. Let us not buy another
one.
(b) You are my sunshine.
(c) Wonderful! . . . — says a disappointed supporter when his favourite team,
which is in disadvantage, gets another humiliating goal.
(d) His eyes nearly popped out of his head.
Szathmári (1958, 146) explains the stylistic effect of hyperbole in the fol-
lowing way: every overstatement is accompanied by the recognition that
there is another linguistic sign for expressing the exaggerated concept,
which is more adequate concerning its reflection to reality, but the speaker
wants to communicate more than that just for the effect. The question
remains what can be understood as ‘effect’ in stylistic studies. Referring
to the results of Sandig (1986), Tolcsvai Nagy (1996, 89, 265) defines it
as an emotional and/or sensory response generated in the hearer, which
derives from the recognition of the relation created by the unification of
expectations, comparing with style types and style attribution. In what
follows, I will attempt to systematically investigate for what kind(s) of
(social psychological) pragmatic effects the speaker prefers a hyperbolic
expression to other linguistic means which reflect reality more adequately.
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2.3. The role of hyperbole in speech
Building on Lausberg’s (1960/1998, 263–4, 410–1) standard work as well
as other sources, Fónagy’s (1975, 482–4) painstaking dictionary entry fo-
cuses on literary/rhetoric rather than everyday uses of hyperbole. How-
ever, his observations are really valuable for the present argumentation.
First, according to Fónagy, hyperbole is one of the characteristics of ex-
cited mental state: it can reflect anxiety or strong emotion resulting
from losing self-control. Second, similarly to such emotional agitation,
the long-lasting thrill of love (which deserves separate mention) makes
the speaker distort the perspective. Third, the consistent use of hyper-
bole renders speech dramatic, solemn, and thus idealizing, making the
style too lofty for ordinary use. Fourth, the overuse of dramatic hyper-
bole and the contrast of a petty topic with a solemn form can turn the
emphatic effect backwards (see the genre of comic epic). Fifth, the desire
to faithfully present the original event and to be expressive can stim-
ulate the speaker to augment the intensity of words. Sixth, rhetorical
hyperbole serves the goal of persuading the audience: the rhetor, on the
one hand, can impede the potential objections by exaggerating the phe-
nomena, and, on the other, hyperbolic polite forms help to get positive
feedback by dispraising the speaker and praising the hearer. Seventh,
the demonstrative overstatement of politeness and homage verges upon
irony: it can express sarcasm, antipathy, or scorn just like dramatic style.
Finally, as a feature of style, hyperbole can characterize dramatic persons.
For instance, Molière wittily parodies the female speech of the 17th cen-
tury, especially the language of French salons in his Learned Ladies with
giddy hyperboles spoken by his characters (Pleasure will kill me, You
can feel a thousand sweet thrills while listening, etc.). Finally, Fónagy
(1975, 484; 2001, 219) does not fail to note that some performances of
hyperbole are genre-specific: it is a compulsory stylistic means of naive
epic and folk-tale among literary genres, and it is common in popular
speech, generally. Other examples from contemporary media culture can
be easily added to this brief list (e.g., the language of advertisements,
sports broadcasts, or TV shows).
Since the understanding of nonliteral meanings is closely related to
the recognition of the speakers’ intention, psycholinguistic research has
also been conducted in order to examine the discourse goals or goal tax-
onomies that underlie the usage of figuration. Roberts and Kreuz (1994)
asked American college students to provide reasons why an individual
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might employ a particular figure of speech on the basis of a definition
and 10 examples. Based on the 134 acceptable responses, the hypotheti-
cal goals were classified according to 19 easily identifiable categories, out
of which hyperbole was mostly mapped to “clarifying” (!), “emphasiz-
ing”, “being humorous”, and “adding interest” (of course, other figures of
speech were associated with other constellations of communicative goals).
The most frequently mentioned goal “to clarify” is somewhat surprising
given the “reduced truth value” of hyperbole (Fónagy 2001, 218). As
Roberts and Kreuz do not provide us with the list of their examples, we
are left to rely on the comments of Kreuz et al. (1998, 94): the feelings
or attitudes of the speaker and his/her relation to the information com-
municated may be clarified by using exaggeration. The utterance in (2),
for example, informs us about a certain event (the national team lost
a match), but the speaker’s emotional reaction to the event (disgust or
disillusionment) is also made clear enough, owing to the hyperbole:
(2) I’ve just watched the Hungarian football team lose for the thousandth time!
Hyperbolic speech may have other functions in specific contexts. Sell
et al. (1997) videotaped conversations between preschool children and
their parents in free-play situations. They found that the parents used
dozens of hyperboles (more than metaphors but less than rhetorical ques-
tions or idioms). As it was expected, adults mostly used this linguistic
means to encourage children in their play activities (e.g., We can fix
anything, can’t we? ) and to express positive evaluation (Wow, that was
perfect!, The tallest bunny I’ve ever seen, etc.).
Colston and Keller (1998) and Colston (1997) concentrate on un-
expected social episodes when overstatement, understatement, and irony
express surprise (e.g., There is not a single person in line here—when two
women walk into a theatre known for very long queues, but as they en-
ter, they see only two people queuing up). Being psycholinguists, Colston
and Keller are primarily interested in which figure is the most effective
and how people comprehend them. Hence their written scenarios con-
tain pre-constructed (supposedly fictitious) examples, out of which for
our purposes it is worth noting the bare fact that hyperbole sometimes is
a verbal reflection of surprise when events do not turn out as previously
expected.
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2.4. The pragmatic perspective
Following Grice’s (1975, 53) theory of conversational postulates and im-
plicatures, mainstream pragmatics has concerned hyperbole and other
common figures of speech as a flout exploiting the first maxim of Quality
(‘Do not say what you believe to be false’). Exploitation means that
the speaker deliberately does not observe a maxim, without wanting to
suspend cooperation or to mislead the hearer. Instead, he/she wishes to
communicate something that is not included in the literal meaning of the
utterance but can be inferred from the conventional meaning, assuming
the obviously cooperative attitude of the speaker, and using information
from the (not expounded) context or background knowledge. Still, if,
according to the aim of the present paper, we want to know what kind(s)
of implicit information (implicatures) can be inferred from exaggerations,
Grice’s own example, in (3), does not serve as a good starting point for
want of explanatory glossing:
(3) Every nice girl loves a sailor.
Since we do not know the context in which utterance (3) is (or can be)
said, the content of the implicature is not obvious at all (it may not be by
chance that Grice, untypically, failed to detail it). For instance, one might
argue that every should be simply replaced by many, and the implicature
is worked out. But let us consider another real-life context: if the speaker
is a sailor and the hearer is a nice girl, then (3) can also implicate that
the girl should like the speaker. This is the indirect message that seems
to be the intended one.
Leech (1983) goes one step further when he posits maxims of polite-
ness, whose clash with the Gricean maxims may lead to the modification
of direct strategies, as long as it does not require too much effort from the
partner. When discussing the interpersonal rhetorical role of hyperbole,
Leech, on the one hand, mentions the enhancement of politeness (e.g.,
What a marvellous meal you cooked! — attributed to his Approbation
Maxim, favoured in praising others), and, on the other hand, he intro-
duces a new principle, the Interest Principle, assuming that idiomatic
hyperboles that occur frequently in ordinary conversation and the pref-
erence of extremities on a scale of news value can and should be derived
from it (Leech 1983, 145–7):
(4) Say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting.
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The Interest Principle encapsulates the common experience that people
prefer interesting conversations with some novelty to boring interchanges,
monotonous in both style and content. Nevertheless, exaggeration used
for creating interest has its limitations as well. In this way, the Maxim
of Quality and the Interest Principle are in conflict all the time: some-
times the former, sometimes the latter wins their perpetual tug-of-war,
but it is the Maxim of Quality as a keystone of rational behaviour and
communicative ethic that is a wider social expectation.
Perhaps more influential than Leech’s, Brown and Levinson’s po-
liteness theory (1978, 222–5; 1987, 217–20) quite irregularly categorizes
hyperbole and litotes as flouts of not the Quality but the Quantity maxim
(‘Do not make your contribution either more or less informative than is
required’): the former is too informative while the latter is not informa-
tive enough compared to the real state of affairs. There is no need to
accept unconditionally this view (at least for hyperbole) in order to rec-
ognize the politeness of derived implicatures (or rather, the face-saving
intention; see below):
(a)(5) There were a million people in the Co-op tonight!
(b) I tried to call a hundred times, but there was never any answer.
Exaggerating the overwhelming circumstances, (5a) is an excuse offered
as an explanation for being late, whereas (5b) could function as an apol-
ogy or decline of responsibility for not getting in touch, indicating that
the speaker tried hard not to hurt the partner. According to Brown and
Levinson, overstatement as a strategy of politeness tends to manifest it-
self when the risk of face loss is relatively high; that is, what is to be said
is opposed to the public self-image of the partners and their expectations
originating from their face-wants, therefore it is worth leaving an ‘out’ (a
defensible interpretation) for mitigating the offence. The offence is the
fact of being late in (5a) and the omitted phone call in (5b).
However, hyperbole is such a flexible figure of speech that we can-
not be satisfied with the above classification of functions, even within
the realm of discourse politeness. In the strategy network of Brown and
Levinson’s theory, there is a branch which ends in the exaggerative pre-
sentation of interest, approval, or sympathy, fulfilling the partner’s desire
that his/her favoured thoughts, acts, possessions should be admitted by
the others (1978, 109–11; 1987, 104–6):
(6) What a fantastic garden you have!
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Since Brown and Levinson proposed the flouting of the Maxim of Quan-
tity instead of the Maxim of Quality, let us add that Grice’s categories
of Relation (‘Be relevant’) and Manner (‘Be perspicuous: Avoid obscu-
rity, ambiguity, etc.’) are also capable of being exploited by hyperbolic
utterances, although the literature seems to disregard these eventualities:
(a)(7) A: Mrs. X is an old bag.
B: ((after a moment of appalled silence))1 The weather has been quite
delightful this summer, hasn’t it?
(b) It is awfully nice of you to take care of me all the time.
Example (7a), again, is taken from Grice (1975, 54) and illustrates the
shift of topic, resulting from the recognition of a conversational inaptitude
(flouting of the Maxim of Relation). But here the contribution of the
hyperbole to the violation of relevance maxim seems to be negligible. By
contrast, (7b) is ambiguous due to the ‘frightening’ exaggeration per se
for the hearer as long as he/she cannot decide whether the communicator
speaks seriously or ironically. If this ambiguity is generated on purpose,
an implicature of Manner arises.
3. The concept of self-presentation
Considering the several approaches applied in previous literature, and
keeping in mind the multiple face of conversational exaggeration as an
interpersonal rhetorical figure of speech, it may seem that a theoretical
framework making the identification of communicative goals of hyperbole
simpler and more elegant can hardly be developed. However, it is a fact
that the problem can be ascribed, at least partly, to the isolation of the—
quite often invented—examples and the narrowing of context, drawing
conclusions either from the opinions of informants as Roberts and Kreuz
(1994) or from particular utterances as Grice (1975), Leech (1983), and
Brown–Levinson (1978; 1987).
1 The transcript symbols used throughout this paper are common in conversation
analysis research (cf. Atkinson – Heritage 1984, ix–xvi). Double parentheses en-
close certain meaningful (mostly nonverbal) details of the scene, intervals in the
stream of talk are timed in tenths of a second and inserted within parentheses,
a colon indicates an extension of the sound or syllable it follows (more colons
prolong the stretch), and emphasis is marked by underlining.
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Therefore, in this section, I will turn to a controllable linguistic ex-
ample for methodological reasons, to a scene from the first widely known
product of the Hungarian feature film industry, Hyppolit, a lakáj (Hyp-
polit, the butler) made in 1931. Since the story is well-known, the inves-
tigation of the context and the social motives of the characters do not
cause any trouble when interpreting the conversation (and the italicized
idiomatic hyperbole) in (8). Clearly, the following part of a dialogue
is not spontaneous. However, it is very similar to real-life exchanges,
thus making it possible to be investigated, just like sequences of natural
conversation, from various aspects mentioned in the literature review:
(8) Mr. Schneider: Te, mama, ki ez a (.2) Hyppolit?
‘Hey, Mum, who is this (.2) Hyppolit?’
Mrs. Schneider: Hh el is felejtettem neked mondani, hogy felvettem egy inast. . .
‘Hh I forgot to tell you that I hired a butler. . . ’ (.8)
Mr. Schneider: ((astonished)) Inast?
‘A butler?’
Mrs. Schneider: Hh i:gen. . . Meg akartalak lepni vele. . .
‘Hh ye:s. . . I wanted to surprise you. . . ’
Mr. Schneider: ((angrily)) Sikerült!
‘You succeeded in that.’
Mrs. Schneider: Remélem, papa, nem haragszol.
‘I hope, Dad, that you are not angry.’
Mr. Schneider: ((ironically)) De::hogy haragszom. Mért haragudjak? Csak
úgy kirúgom, hogy a. . . a lába nem éri a földet!
‘I am no::t angry at all. Why should I be angry? I will just
kick him out such that his feet will not touch the ground! ’
Mrs. Schneider: De:hogy rúgod. Szépen fölveszed a kabátodat, mert ingujjban
nem fogadhatod. Huszonhét évig szolgált egy grófi háznál.
‘You wo:n’t. You will put on your coat because you cannot
receive him in a shirt. He worked for a count for 27 years.’
Mr. Schneider: Hát nálunk nem fog olyan sokáig szolgálni.
‘He will not work for us for that long.’
Mrs. Schneider: De papa. . .
‘But Dad. . . ’
Mr. Schneider: Csak bízd rám!
‘Just leave it to me!’
Gloss: Mr. Schneider is a petty bourgeois turned transport entrepreneur.
His wife, a woman with an air of snobbery, persuaded by the employment
agent and without asking Schneider, tries to transmute her household
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into something more distinguished than it actually is by hiring Hyppolit,
formerly a butler with the family of a count. The exchange cited in
(8) occurs at the dinner table just before Hyppolit’s entry. We see that
Schneider does not want to hear about the idea: he insists on the old
way of life that he is accustomed to, and, in a firm tone of voice he tells
his defensive wife about his dislike of her plan because of the offence on
his authority (his wife hired Hyppolit without his consent). Some mo-
ments later, when the elegant Hyppolit, with an excellent style, enters
personally, Schneider turns into a timid petty burgeois, his behaviour
changes dramatically: forgetting his former vigour, he tries to accommo-
date to the expectations of the aristocratic butler, and finally, he accepts
his hiring, giving in to his wife’s will.
What does Schneider communicate when he says he “will kick him
out such that his feet will not touch the ground”? Since in Hungarian
this is an exaggerative idiom (cf. (1d)) that states a literally impossible
act (we think this on the basis of our world and linguistic knowledge),
at first, we have to find another version of this expression which is more
adequate in its relation to reality (cf. Szathmári 1958, 146), for example:
he will sack Hyppolit, he will not employ him. However, the informational
content of the utterance is not yet totally exploited. The next step is the
emotional load (discussed in Lausberg 1960/1998; Fónagy 1975; Fussell–
Moss 1998; etc.)—recall that it was a concomitant of the hyperbole seen
in (2), too—: Schneider is annoyed by the snobbery of his wife and by
Hyppolit’s unexpected appearance. That is why he overdoes the way he
will treat Hyppolit. The manifestation of an emotionally accentuated,
vigorous attitude is at the same time a defensive effort to repair the
challenge of the role ‘master of the house’ on the level of self-presentation.
This essential self-presentational layer of meaning generation de-
mands a social psychological extension of the traditional linguistic per-
spective while examining the inferential content of an utterance in its en-
tirety. Thus, before proceeding any further with the discussion, we need
to shed light on what is included in the concept of self-presentation in
order to integrate it into a complex social psychological pragmatic model.
Self-presentation is the pervasive attempt to control self-relevant im-
ages that are projected in social interactions (Schlenker 1980, 6; Tedeschi
1981, 3; Leary 1995, 2). While some authors use the terms self-presenta-
tion and impression management interchangeably (Leary–Kowalski 1990;
Leary 1993; 1995), others make a distinction between them, emphasiz-
ing that impression management involves the goal-directed control of the
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
362 attila l. nemesi
outer image of not only the actor but that of other persons, associa-
tions, entities, and ideologies as well; hence, impression management is a
broader and more encompassing notion than self-presentation (Schlenker
1980; Schneider 1981). A third technical term also frequently employed
for the description of approximately the same social phenomena is face-
work, which represents all kinds of behaviour consistent to either the
speaker’s or the hearer’s face (Goffman 1955; Brown–Levinson 1978; 1987;
Penman 1990; Tracy 1990; Nwaye 1992; Mao 1994; Wood–Kroger 1994;
Muntigl–Turnbull 1998).
The first seminal promoter of research on self-presentation, Goff-
man (1955; 1959)follows the spiritual heritage of sociologically anchored
symbolic interactionism when he gives a purely external characteriza-
tion of the self as a set of faces or images originating not from personal
traits but the ritual order of public encounters. For him, faces are posi-
tive social values or approved social attributes a person effectively claims
for himself/herself by the line others assume he/she has taken during a
particular contact (1955, 213). However, in the flow of symbolic com-
munication participants have to constantly confront the danger of being
in the wrong face, being out of face, or losing face. To prevent these
embarrassing situations, every community develops a set of face-saving
acts, which, as mentioned earlier, is interpreted by Brown and Levinson
(1978; 1987) as the repertoire of (linguistic) politeness. An important
difference is that Goffman concentrates on the performance of the ac-
tor, whereas politeness theory focuses primarily on the face wants of the
hearer (Penman 1990; Tracy 1990; Wood–Kroger 1994). In addition,
Brown and Levinson (1978, 66–9; 1987, 61–4) give some individualistic
content to the Goffmanian dramaturgical self, which does not meet the
values of every culture (Nwaye 1992; Mao 1994). In contrast with this,
current research into self-presentation (1) regards facework not only as
a defensive action directed towards the face needs of the hearer (Arkin
1981; Tedeschi–Norman 1985; Penman 1990); (2) stresses the interplay of
private self-processes and interpersonal determinants in impression man-
agement (Schlenker 1985; Baumeister 1986; Leary–Kowalski 1990; Leary
1993); and (3), besides the institutionalized roles traced back to the close-
ness of the social structure and the rituality of interaction, allows for
constructing individual faces or self-identification, which involves all the
processes, means, or results of showing oneself to be a particular type of
person, thereby specifying one’s identity (Schlenker 1986, 23).
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Adopting Leary’s (1993; 1995; Leary–Kowalski 1990) in-depth con-
ceptualization, self-presentation can be seen as the consequence of three
discrete psychological processes that include impression monitoring, im-
pression motivation, and impression construction. Impression monitoring
is largely determined by the state of self-awareness: the more aware peo-
ple are of their outer social image in a given situation, the more probable
they will consider the self-presentational implications of their actions.
The high or low level of average self-consciousness has a bearing upon
personal characteristics as well. Among situational components, derailed
interactions immediately draw attention to the face of the actor. Jones
and Pittman (1982, 234) discuss some of the settings in which impres-
sion monitoring (and, therefore, self-presentation) is absent or minimal:
(1) high task involvement, physical or intellectual challenge, (2) purely
expressive behaviour (expression of anger, joy, enthusiasm, etc.), (3) a
large class of overlearned, habitual social interchanges, and (4) authen-
tic self-disclosures (e.g., therapy sessions, encounter groups, and intimate
relationships). We have to say, then, that when one of the above settings
forms the backbone of the context, the use of hyperbole does not neces-
sarily represent an intention of self-presentation (albeit a non-intended
secondary impression can be evoked in the hearer), but in every other
case the possibility of strategic facework is maintained.
Impression motivation is strongly but not directly connected to im-
pression monitoring. In Leary’s view, it depends on three factors, namely
the perceived goal-relevance of impressions, the value of the person’s de-
sired goals, and the potential discrepancy between desired and current
images. For instance, Schneider is likely to be oriented to use a vigorous
tone of voice in (8) because of the third motive: he feels that his face is
threatened before his wife’s eyes, who shows less respect to him than he
would desire as her husband.
Impression construction that calculates what kind of impression could
elicit the desired feedback from the partners is subsumed by five an-
tecedents. Self-concept and desired identity images represent the consid-
erations of our private self: people prefer suggesting impressions which
match how they see themselves, and generally, it is easier and more ratio-
nal to act in this manner than showing something different than what we
really are or want to be like. The remaining determinants of impression
construction (role and normative constraints, target values, and current
or potential social image) are interpersonal in nature: expectations of
peers and the structure of society give content to face, just like internal
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features do. Of course, the face that Schneider tries to construct and
assure for himself in his wife’s eyes is composed of these factors, too.
4. Self-implicatures: a complex social
psychological pragmatic approach
In a previous paper, referring to other relevant works, I argued that
within the multiple message of linguistic communication not only fac-
tive or objective but subjective or self-content should be observed as well
(Nemesi 2000, 434–5; see also Németh T. 2003; 2004 about rational and
interpersonal principles of the communicative use of language for a simi-
lar reasoning). Hence, conversation includes information about the topic
of speech on the one hand, and information about the selves of the com-
municators on the other. The exchange of information about the topic of
speech is regulated by maxims of rationality (à la Grice 1975) as opposed
to symbolic signs concerning the selves of the interactants, whose main
motive is what I call the strategy of linguistic self-presentation: in verbal
interactions, normally, people try to present themselves in such a way
that they would like to be seen (Nemesi 2000, 426).
As for implicatures, Grice does not mention self-implicatures: only
objective implicatures occur in his Logic and conversation. Consider, for
example, the following:
(9) A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
In (9), according to Grice (1975, 51), B implicates that Smith has, or
may have, a girlfriend in New York, that is why he often goes there. (It
is interesting that Grice does not allow for other potential implicatures—
for instance that Smith works a lot, and has to perform professional tasks
in New York, and therefore he does not have enough time to maintain
a relationship.) Three full stops in writing or intonation and additional
nonverbal cues in speech can mark the presence of the unsaid thought,
but without these it may be the case that B does not implicate anything,
he/she only continues the conversation. Anyhow, it is not questionable
that the interpretation preferred by Grice covers an objective implicature:
the conversation is about Smith’s private life, and B’s indirect allusion
adds something to this topic. A self-implicature would be found if we
could suppose (knowing A, B, and the context of the exchange more
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deeply) that B represents his/her initiation with the implicature or tries
to establish intimacy by virtue of a gossip, or rather, that he/she wants to
make the conversation (and thus, himself/herself) more interesting, etc.
In fact, self-implicatures were discovered by politeness theorists, even
if the term is not used by them. While Leech (1983, 131–51) describes,
among other directions of interpersonal rhetoric, the minimization of ben-
efit and praise of self, and also the mitigation of antipathy and disagree-
ment towards the partner in his maxims, Brown and Levinson (1978;
1987) see politeness as saving of faces; thus, any politeness implicature
can be construed as a face-saving implicature. Self, face, and impression
management (or self-presentation), nonetheless, are social psychological
concepts; linguistics does not have to account for them, just like social
psychology does not examine the layers of linguistic meaning because
it can borrow models from semantics or pragmatics. It is obvious that
while analyzing the hyperbolic utterance in (8), a self-implicature was
pointed out: though the emotional relation and attitude towards the
topic of speech represents a specific intermediate type between objective
and self-implicatures (it informs about both the topic and the speaker),
the aspect of self-presentation has led our investigation into the area of
social psychology. Neither the linguistic facets of politeness nor the role
of hyperbole in discourse can be described within the frames of only prag-
matics or only social psychology. The cooperation and attachment of the
two disciplines can yield a more detailed explanation of the phenomena
covered by interpersonal rhetoric.
To recapitulate, the Gricean umbrella has proven to be steady theo-
retical ground: concerning its literal meaning, hyperbole really is a partial
lie, that is, it has a reduced truth value or extremely subjective connota-
tion, and this fact is mutually unequivocal for the conversational partic-
ipants. The speaker, therefore, cannot mean to mislead his/her partner;
rather, to utilize its expressivity in the representation of the emotional
relation and attitude towards the topic of conversation, and—through
increasing expressivity — to construct, maintain, or repair his/her own
face desired in social contact, or to serve the faces of others. At the
other side, the hearers recognize the violation of the Maxim of Quality,
they reconstruct the truth value of the proposition while some kind of
hypothesis is created about the implicit message of the exaggeration. If
the emotional load of the hyperbolic utterance is not credible, the en-
deavour to manage the self (which the speaker, naturally, does not want
to make visible) may be discovered.
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If we are on the right track in analyzing overstatements, then steps
followed in the case of the example taken from the film Hyppolit, a lakáj
(Hyppolit, the butler) can be generalized (cf. Grice 1975, 49–50) as shown
in (10):
(a)(10) The speaker has said that p;
(b) according to the linguistic, metacognitive, and world knowledge of every
competent language user, p is an exaggerative proposition; the speaker ob-
viously violated the Maxim of Quality with its use;
(c) there is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the Gricean
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle, thus he/she does not want to
mislead anybody but rather to exploit the maxim;
(d) hence, first, supposition q is needed, which is a more adequate version of p
concerning its relation to the real state of affairs (in a diachronic perspec-
tive, q may become lexicalized—but even so, the original semantic contrast
between p and q more or less remains);
second, supposition r is needed for identifying the speaker’s emotional and
evaluative attitude towards the topic of conversation on the basis of the
hyperbole (r can also be conventionalized, at least partly; however, the stylis-
tic value of the expression holds the subjective overtones);
and third, insofar as the context and supposition r jointly support such an
additive inference, supposition s is needed as well, which is a self-implicature
on the self-presentational role of p manifested through r ;
(e) the speaker knows (and knows that the participants know that he/she knows)
that it is within their competence to work out, or grasp intuitively, that q
and r (and s) are required, surpassing the literal meaning of p;
(f) the speaker has done nothing to stop his/her partners thinking q and r
(and s);
(g) that is, he/she intends the hearers to think, or is at least willing to allow
them to think that q and r (and s); so he/she has implicated q and r (and s).
Some readers may think at this point that the pattern proposed in (10)
deals with literal meaning as if it was a unique concept without any prob-
lem and the reaching of at least q and r from the literal meaning of p
should be imagined in such a way that the hearer always understands the
literal meaning at first, and then, if (b) and (c) are valid, he/she goes on
with interpreting the indirect emotional and social meanings. Actually,
one of the most vigorous lines of critique of Grice’s theory has been ques-
tioning the psychological reality of this two-levelled (sentence-meaning
vs. utterance-meaning) model (see, e.g., Rumelhart 1979; Gibbs 1984;
1994; 2002; Recanati 1995; Ariel 2002; Giora 2002). Aside from the fact
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that the intermediate level of utterance-type-meaning with a host of de-
fault inferences or generalized conversational implicatures seems to be
ignored in the literal meaning debate (see Levinson 2000, 21–7), what I
am inclined to think is that the widespread rejection of Grice is based on
a disputable view of his goals by taking him to be engaged in the same
project that his opponents (mostly, relevance theorists and cognitive psy-
cholinguists) are: making sense of the psychological processes by which
the audience interpret utterances (Saul 2002). No doubt, Grice’s charac-
terization of conversational implicature—and the present application of
his steps for describing the full message of a hyperbole in (10)—would
be very poorly suited to offering an accurate theory of the interpretation
process itself. But the Gricean approach has a different subject mat-
ter: neither the speaker’s nor the audience’s perspective is stated to be
favoured; instead, it provides a scheme of how interactants cooperate in
talk exchanges by conveying explicit and implicit information. We never
know what the real intention of the speaker was and what interpretation
the hearer actually arrived at; however, we can take the position of a
keen observer, inferring independently what was said and implicated by
the use of a given linguistic expression at a given setting. The reader is
kindly asked to test this fallible intuition.
As far as the notion of literal meaning is concerned, I agree with Das-
cal (1987, 264) that it plays a role in understanding figurative language
(which does not mean that the complete literal meaning of the utterance
must be analyzed), but only if the frequent use of a phrase has not al-
ready led to total (or a high degree of) conventionalization, a historical
development which gives quasi-literal status to originally figurative mean-
ings in people’s mental lexicon from time to time. Like metaphors that
have been commonly characterized as existing on a continuum of conven-
tionality, ranging from dead (or frozen) to living (or novel), hyperboles
also involve many frozen forms which are not implicatures in nature any
more, thus their meaning cannot be regarded synchronically as figurative.
I suspect that if researchers systematically separated diachronic and syn-
chronic figurativeness, in so far as it is technically possible in case of a
continuum, the notion of literal or, more precisely, conventional meaning
would regain some of its explanatory power. In sum, at a lower level of
conventionality, it can be safely hypothesized that people, consciously or
unconsciously, compare what was said by the speaker with the real state
of affairs, and when a blatant exaggeration is disclosed, they try to assess
the implicit content of the overstatement.
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5. The complex approach at work:
Analyzing further hyperbolic utterances
To ascertain whether or not the pattern given in (10) is tenable, further
analyses of hyperbolic discourses are required. For the sake of vividness
and advantages indicated in connection with the Hyppolit -example (con-
trollability, the transparency of the characters’ social motives, and the
similarity between conversational situations depicted and everyday inter-
action), let us continue with some more Hungarian feature films from the
1930s, beginning with one part of Ida regénye (My wife the miss—The
story of Ida, 1934):
(11) Ella: ((stirring the goulash)) Megvagyunk mi Julis nélkül is. Ilyen bogrács-
gulyást még az öregapjuk sem evett. Igaz-e, Bogár úr?
‘We can do without Julis as well. Even your grandfathers did not eat
such a goulash, did they, Mr. Bogár?’
Bogár: ((looking at his plate with a long face)) Hát az igaz. Ilyet nemigen
ettek. (1.0) Tessék énnekem megmondani, de őszintén: mit tetszett
ebbe beletenni, hogy olyan (.4) i:stentelenül finom?
‘That is true. They did not eat such a goulash. (1.0) Please tell me
sincerely: what did you put into this that makes it so (.4) te:rribly
tasty? ’
Ella: Saját receptem. Akar még egy porciót?
‘It is my own recipe. Do you want some more?’
Bogár: ((with a refusing gesture)) Köszönöm, ippen elég volt. Jaj nekem. De
jó volt. . .
‘No more, thank you. Oh dear. It was so good . . . ’
Gloss: Mr. Bogár, a winetaster, works for Péter Ó, a winetrader in Eger.
Péter Ó lost his wife a long time ago. Then he lived a debauched life,
but now he remarries: he chooses Ella, an actress from a local theatre
with a questionable past. The new husband has an adolescent daughter
from his first marriage, Ida, who is expelled from the convent because
she admits to writing a love letter for another girl. The young couple
is disturbed by her unexpected arrival, therefore they quickly marry her
off through a personals ad. They send even Julis, the cook, with Ida to
the new flat in Pest, but this way there is no one to cook for them at
home. In the beginning, Ella tries to do all the household chores (some
time later her enthusiasm subsides, as we see). In (11) she praises one
of her first meals to Mr. Bogár, who sits at the table with a sour face
and who does not dare to tell her directly that the goulash tastes bad,
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instead, he asks an ambiguous and ironic question (cf. (7b)). Ella does
not recognize the irony behind his words, she tries to offer the meal to
him again, which reflects her unrefined character.
According to the symbols introduced in (10), p1: the goulash is ter-
ribly tasty and p2: it was so good to eat; p1 and p2 are ironic hyperboles
or hyperbolic ironies (cf. (1c)), therefore q1: the goulash is not good and
q2: it was bad to eat; r1 and r2: Bogár dislikes the fact that the goulash
is not good but he must eat it; s1 and s2: Bogár does express his real
opinion, at least indirectly, but he applies a face-saving form using dis-
guised irony—thus, he does not risk seriously his subordinated state (his
job) towards Ella. Note that here only the audience works out these
implicatures. The addressee herself cannot catch the hints: she thinks
that Mr. Bogár is flattering on her. Therefore, if we adopt Ella’s point of
view, irony is out of the question, and what remain are bare hyperboles
with the opposite (non-ironic) meaning.
The next example comes from the comedy Három sárkány (Three
spinsters, 1936) featuring typical Hungarian landless gentry:
(12) Csaholyi: Most arról van szó, Jóska, hogy téged akarnak felküldeni Pestre az
ügyet elintézni. ((eagerly)) Nézd, Jóska, én kilenc éve nem voltam
Pesten. Én már elepedek, én már elsorvadok, engem már ellep a
gaz, szívemet benövi a bojtorján itt, a kávási határban. ((begging))
Jóska! Csináld meg, hogy én menjek föl Pestre!
‘Now, Jóska, they want you to go to Pest to clear up this case.
Look, Jóska, I have not been to Pest for nine years. I’m desolate,
I’m wasting away, I will be covered with weed, my heart will be
overgrown with burdock here in the Kávás fields. Jóska! Please
convince them that I should go to Pest!’
Kempelen: ((hesitating)) Nézd, lelkem, ez nagy felelősség. . .
‘Look, my dear, it is a great responsibility. . . ’
Csaholyi: Jóska, ki tudja, hogy meddig élek én még. . . És, hát így haljak
meg én, Csaholyi Balázs, volt hetes huszárkapitány, hogy legalább
egy-két szép napom ne legyen azon a gyö:nyörű Pesten?. . .
‘Jóska, who knows how long more I will live. . . And should I, Balázs
Csaholyi, ex-captain of hussars, die without having some days in
that beau:tiful Pest?’
Kempelen: Borzasztó, hogy mindig leveszel a lábamról. Tavaly is így vettél ki
tőlem 175 pengő és valami 60 fillért.
‘It is terrible that you always get me to do what you want. Last year
you got 175 pengo and some 60 fillér out of me in this way.’
Gloss: The happy-go-lucky Balázs Csaholyi lives under the guardianship
of his sisters, the three spinsters, at their property in Kávás. He tries
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to exploit every rare occasion to leave his isolation in the country, thus
he tries to profit from the 8000 pengő debt of his son, a law student at
Pest, who—just like his father—is careless, too. He gets Kempelen, the
lawyer of the family, to persuade his sisters that he (Csaholyi) should go
to Pest to clear up this case. In (12) he is trying to convince Kempelen
that he would like to see Pest once again, free from the protection of his
sisters. As can be seen, he accumulates the hyperbolic sighs recalling the
images of the Hungarian ‘wasteland’. The hesitating Kempelen is not
able to refuse the cunning demand, even though he suspects that he will
have some problems caused by this trip.
p1–p4: Csaholyi is desolate, wasting away, will be covered with weed,
his heart will be overgrown with burdock in Kávás; p1–p4 are metaphoric
hyperboles (cf. (1b)), therefore q1–q4: he begins to lose his vitality in
Kávás; r1–r4: he finds it hard to bear his fate; s1–s4: as a man, he is
worthy of compassion, his situation is unbearable, his sisters treat him
unjustly, the partner (Kempelen) must feel pity for him. As to impression
motivation, Csaholyi’s strategic goal (getting to travel to Pest) makes the
image of a pitiful ex-cavalier sentenced to exile in the country relevant,
which is constructed in Kempelen, who is in an intermediary position
between Csaholyi and his sisters, and the goal itself is worth anything for
him—these motives start him on the self-presentation according to s1–s4.
Let us look at an example of hyperbole with a finer emotional tone
(Lovagias ügy (An affair of honour), 1936):
(13) Baba: ((arrives home excited)) Kez’ csókolom! Szervusz, apu.
‘Good afternoon! Hi, Dad.’
Mrs. Virág: Hol voltál ilyen sokáig?
‘Where have you been so long?’
Baba: Jaj, anyu, ne kérdezz most semmit, mert én mondok egy fan-
tasztikusat: a Réz Pali kivitt az autójával a jégre, és megbeszéltük,
hogy tanul nálam angolul, és öt pengő ötvenet fizet óránként!
‘Oh Mum, don’t ask anything now because I tell you something
fantastic: Pali Réz took me to the ice with his car, and we agreed
that I would teach him English, and he will pay 5 pengő 50 an
hour!’
Mr. Virág: Addig csinálod ezt a szélhámosságot evvel az angollal, míg egyszer,
majd meglátod, lecsuknak (.4) Márianosztróra.
‘You will do this mischief with your English until the day you’ll be
jailed in (.4) Márianosztró, you’ll see.’
Mrs. Virág: Öt pengő ötvenet fizet egy órára?
‘5 pengő 50 for an hour?’
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Baba: Kereken. Jaj, anyukám, adj egy kis levest, mer’ ré :misztően éhes
vagyok !
‘Exactly. Oh Mum, give me a little soup cause I am a:wfully hungry! ’
Gloss: Mr. Virág, chief accountant with the Milkó tinned food factory,
has an argument one day with Pál Milkó, who is kept in his job by
the director, his uncle. Milkó slaps the elderly man on the face, and
the latter, deeply offended, quits his job but hides this from his family.
Milkó would like to repair his wrongdoing. He writes a letter of apology
(which the grandmother takes for a bill from the tailor and puts it into
her pocket), and later, because his letter is not answered, becomes the
renter of their spare room under the alias Pál Réz in order to give them
financial support. Mrs. Virág comes to like him because of his kindness,
and he falls in love with Baba, the daughter of the Virágs at first sight.
Baba, who does not speak English well, would like to help her parents: she
wants to earn money to perfect her own English by teaching the boy next
door and Pali ‘Réz’, who speaks English perfectly, but asks Baba to teach
him English with the intention of courting her. Her excitement in (13) is
caused more by the new lover than by the new student. Baba recognizes
that the wealthy tenant likes her and she returns his feelings. Her ‘awful’
hunger must be analysed in the light of these: it latently expresses the
happy emotion of a new love (the significative mimics of Mrs. Virág shows
that she notices this, too), there is no rhetorical awareness behind it (cf.
situation (2) of Jones– Pittman (1982, 234), characterized by the low
level of impression monitoring).
p: Baba is awfully hungry; p contains an exaggerative adverb, there-
fore q : Baba is very hungry; r : she admits a positive attitude towards
eating; s: not present or uncertain—perhaps change of topic, prevention
of other parental questions concerning the afternoon spent with Pali Réz,
strengthening the face of a ‘responsible, clever young girl’ (with a good
sense for business) rather than the face of a ‘flirting girl’. As I referred to
this before, the absence of an intended self-implicature or the difficulty of
its detection do not mean that the observers (here, mainly, Mrs. Virág)
cannot have some kind of impression of the speaker on the basis of her
verbal and nonverbal behaviour.
Our fourth excerpt in this section is taken from the comedy Az én
lányom nem olyan (My daughter is different, 1937):
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(14) Kalocsay: Ide figyeljen, én segíteni fogok magának. Maga viszont segítségemre
lesz nekem. Rendben van?
‘Look, I will help you. But you will also help me. All right?’
Gitta: Milyen ügyben?
‘In what kind of case?’
Kalocsay: Annie tante ugyanis megígérte, hogy kifizeti az összes adósságaimat,
ha szakítok a lump élettel, és megházasodom. (.4) Magát szemelte
ki erre a célra. . .
‘Aunt Annie promised that she will pay back all my debts if I break
with reveller life and get married. (.4) She has chosen you for this
purpose.’
Gitta: ((laughing)) S maga megígérte, hogy elvesz?
‘And have you promised that you will marry me?’
Kalocsay: Meg. (.6) Neki. ((impudently)) Magának viszont ünnepélyesen
megígérem az ellenkezőjét.
‘I did. (.6) To her. To you, I solemnly promise the opposite.’
Gitta: ((offended)) Nagyon kedves. . .
‘Very kind of you. . . ’
Kalocsay: Én ugyanis megmagyaráztam Annie néninek, hogy a maga
meghódításához nekem másfél évre van szükségem. . . hát, őszin-
tén szólva, ezt most már nem hiszem. . .
‘You see, I explained to aunt Annie that I will need one and a half
year to conquer you... But now, to tell you the truth, I don’t think
so. . . ’
Gitta: Pedig nyugodtan elhiheti.
‘But you can safely assume that.’
Kalocsay: ((courting)) Igazán? Gondolja, hogy ennyi idő alatt sikerülne?
‘Really? Do you think I would succeed within this time?’
Gitta: Nem, nem sikerülne. Magának ehhez ezer esztendő se lenne elég.
‘No, you wouldn’t. You would not succeed even within a thousand
years.’
Kalocsay: ((looks at his watch, joking)) Hát, annyi időm nincs. . .
‘Well, I don’t have that much time. . . ’
Gloss: Gitta Hubay is 20 years old, a girl with modern attitudes, who
is courted by Feri Fekete. Not particularly liked by Gitta’s parents, es-
pecially her old-fashioned father, Fekete dates Gitta in secret. When he
calls her to his flat pretending to be ill, Gitta becomes disappointed in
him and breaks with him. The highly respected aunt Annie, who wants to
marry Gitta off, would like to introduce the girl to her husband’s nephew,
Sándor Kalocsay, not suspecting that they know each other through Feri,
and they like each other, too. After aunt Annie tells Kalocsay who she
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would like to introduce to him, he goes to Gitta’s house. He asks to
leave the rich old lady in her belief that they would meet for the first
time at the party. At this time, Kalocsay does not know whether Gitta
really loves Feri Fekete, thus, he tries to find out about the girl’s feel-
ings by behaving in an arrogant and scornful way. Gitta’s hyperbolic
utterance in (14) is an answer to Kalocsay’s egoistic, almost disrespectful
manner: she does not know whether the young man is joking or speaking
seriously, however, she expresses the offendedness of a young lady in a
symbolic way and refuses the impudence. Kalocsay’s joke at the end of
the conversation convinces her that the young man is teasing her because
he actually wants to court her.
p: Gitta says that Kalocsay would not conquer her even within a
thousand years; p contains an extreme attribute of quantity, therefore
q : according to Gitta, Kalocsay could not or would not conquer her; r :
she categorically refuses the thought of Kalocsay’s courting; s: Gitta is a
moral young lady, who is not so easy to conquer as Kalocsay thinks. The
message of self-implicature s can be traced back to Gitta’s self-concept,
her positive and negative identity images, and the social expectations
towards an ideal woman.
The last selected passage is one of the love duets in Halálos tavasz
(Deadly spring, 1937):
(15) Egry: ((grasps Edit’s arm, intimately)) Ide hallgass! Tegnap Budán sétáltam
egy álomszerű, elhagyott kis utcán. Ág utca. Láttam egy házat, ki volt rá
írva: kiadó. Bementem. Csak egy szoba volt benne. Egy. (1.0) Kivettem
az egész házat kerttel együtt hat hónapra.
‘Listen to me! Yesterday I was walking in Buda in a dreamlike abandoned
little street. Ág Street. I saw a house, it was to rent. I went in. There
was only one room in it. Only one. (1.0) I have rented the whole house
with the garden for six months.’
Edit: Te el akarsz menni ebből a házból?
‘Do you want to leave this house?’
Egry: Dehogy. De ott nem zavarnának bennünket.
‘Not at all. But there, we would not be disturbed.’
Edit: Őrült!
‘You’re crazy! ’
Egry: Miért? Anyád előtt már a menyasszonyom vagy.
‘Why? In your mother’s eyes you are already my fiancée.’
Edit: Nem, nem. Semmi szín alatt.
‘No, no. Not by any means.’
Egry: Nézd. . . ((change of scene, they are walking in Buda))
‘Look. . . ’
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
374 attila l. nemesi
Gloss: Dr. Iván Egry, a landowner from the country, gets a job in Buda-
pest. He first meets Edit, the daughter of the ex-minister Ralben, in a
staircase. He tries to call her on the phone, he sends a message to her
on a gramophone disk, then with the help of a friend, he gets himself
invited to the Ralbens’ party. Edit is now Count Ahrenberg’s fiancée,
but she accepts Egry’s heated courting. Egry becomes a daily visitor at
the Ralbens’. Edit’s mother seems to dislike their relation, however, she
promises them her support, while Mr. Ralben does not even recognize
the presence of a new suitor, nevertheless, he and his mysterious wife
disturb the privacy of the young couple at every turn. Egry proposes au-
daciously in (15) to spend the afternoons in a rented house in Buda. Edit
is surprised by the tempting offer, which overtly ignores the conventions
of courting, and she calls the passionate man crazy. In this context, this
hyperbole is a reaction to the challenge of the socially expected role of a
young woman. Its credibility is somehow weakened by Edit’s nonverbal
signs, which suggest uncertainty and secret thoughts. Indeed, she later
agrees to the dates in Buda at Egry’s insistence.
p: Edit calls Egry crazy; p is literally an exaggeration, therefore q :
Egry is too audacious and passionate; r : Edit is frightened by Egry’s
impudently sincere proposal and passionate behaviour, which she con-
demns (or, at least, does not regard as usual); s: Edit is an honest girl,
who knows what is acceptable by the etiquette, and she does not want
to do anything that is opposed to it. Similarly to the previous exam-
ple, the content of the self-implicature is constructed by the relation of
the heroine’s self-concept, positive and negative identity images, and the
ideal role of a woman.
6. Conclusion
All in all, three important conclusions can be made on the basis of the
analyses. The first is a methodological one: the place of the relevant
linguistic data in discourse, the situation of speech in its entirety, and
the appropriate knowledge of the participants’ interactional motives can
illuminate certain pieces of information which may remain hidden if we
tried to analyze the pragmatic or rhetorical function of figuration without
any context. However, the incidental circumstances do not exclude at all
the possibility of generalization. The second conclusion is that every
hyperbole conveys the speaker’s (real or merely presented) relation or
attitudes towards the topic of communication. Further, the expression of
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emotional relation and attitude tends to be subordinated to the speaker’s
attempt (according to the social psychological laws of interaction) to
create an intended ideal impression on the partners — this is the third
main conclusion.
Public acts inevitably create impressions on the observers. Since
the possible implications of this simple fact can be too important for
anyone not to affect behaviour, no wonder that, as Goffman (1959, 4)
put it, “[w]hen an individual appears in the presence of others, there will
usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will
convey an impression to others which is in his interest to convey.” Thus,
it must be natural that the use of exaggeration is not an exception to
this many-sided tendency in behaviour, albeit the rhetorical awareness of
the speaker may be at a preattentive level, and the stylistic value of the
linguistic expression can lose its genuineness, becoming conventionalized
by frequent use.
The other means of interpersonal rhetoric (metaphor, irony, litotes,
etc.) have been mentioned here only briefly. I suppose that the complex
social psychological pragmatic approach applied in this paper can be
fruitful in investigating their discourse goals as well (which are surely
different from the ones of hyperbole). But, as for hyperbole, what is also
needed is the quantitative and genre-related extension of the linguistic
database in order to be able to draw more refined conclusions about the
nature of self-implicature.
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